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Spectrummanagement based on private commons is argued to be a realistic scenario for cognitive
radio deployment within the current mobile market structure. A scenario is proposed where a
secondary entrant operator leases spectrum from a primary incumbent operator. The secondary
operator innovates incorporating cognitive radio technology, and it competes in quality of service
and price against the primary operator in order to provide service to users. We aim to assess
which benefit users get from the entry of secondary operators in the market. A game theory-based
model for analyzing both the competition between operators and the subscription decision by
users is proposed. We conclude that an entrant operator adopting an innovative technology is
better oﬀ entering the market, and that a regulatory authority should intervene first allowing the
entrant operator to enter the market and then setting a maximum amount of spectrum leased. This
regulatory intervention is justified in terms of users utility and social welfare.
1. Introduction
The traditional approach to spectrummanagement, widely known as command- and-control,
has been highly prescriptive, since regulators decide not only the use of a particular band,
but also which users are allowed to transmit in the band. Although the approach can result in
highly technical eﬃciency of spectrum use, under current circumstances of spectrum scarcity,
there has been much evidence that suggests that regulators are failing to maximize value.
Alternative approaches to command-and-control have been proposed and tested
for the two last decades. A range of approaches fall under the general name of market
mechanisms. The essential idea is to allow pricing mechanisms to act as an incentive for
holders of spectrum to optimize their use, buying more if their business case can justify it,
selling spectrum if they have in excess, and adopting technologies that can use spectrum
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more eﬃciently where economically viable. Economic theory suggests that in a market which
is performing well, this will lead to a division of spectrum that maximizes economic value.
The simplest of the market instruments to adopt is probably the use of auctions as a
mechanism for distributing spectrum. Interest in using auctions to assign frequency rights
increased markedly around the world during the 1990s. But auctions on their own still
“freeze” the assignment of spectrum. Auctions need to be accompanied by mechanisms
to trade and change the use of spectrum as market conditions change, and new services
become available. Secondary trading aka. spectrum trading is the trading of spectrum rights
after the primary assignment. Proponents of spectrum trading argue that the design of
markets intended to facilitate transactions should result in economically eﬃcient outcomes.
Furthermore, spectrum trading is made much more powerful when it is combined with
policies aimed at promoting flexibility in use, as far as services and technologies are
concerned.
Another alternative to command-and-control is the commons approach. It is based on
the argument that radio spectrum is a public resource that should be equitably and fairly
accessible to everyone without undue government regulations. The commons model has
some variants. In the purest variant, no entity has exclusive license to the spectrum band.
As such, anyone can own any number of devices operating in such a band—which is the case
of the current ISM 2.4GHz band.
A new concept within the commonsmodel was introduced by the FCC in 2004which is
called private commons 1. The concept allows new agents to access the spectrum owned by a
license holder, where the responsibility of setting rules for access by devices not participating
in primary use of the license, and enforcement of those rules is entirely with the license holder.
Under private commons, the license holder maintains a customer relationship with the new
agents and may charge a transaction fee for the relationship.
Following a similar evolution, technology has made progresses which have matched
the evolution in spectrummanagement described above. We would like to focus on cognitive
radio. This technology aims at allowing aggressive and opportunistic exploitation of white
spaces or spectrum “gaps” in spatiotemporal domain. In its simplest operational model,
given a primary spectrum user with an exclusive use license to a spectrum band, a
homogeneous population of secondary users continuously performs spectrum sensing to
estimate whether a spectrum access opportunity is available, and when it is available,
the secondary users contend or coordinate their transmissions, until an onset of primary
transmission is detected. Then the secondary devices must cease transmission and “vacate”
the spectrum.
Although the cognitive radio technology is promising, there are a number of questions
which require investigation. We would like to draw attention to the possibility that the
transmissions of a large number of secondary users can eventually be free of charge in a band
that the primary operator has paid to acquire. We argue that this possibility seems unfeasible
and that the deployment of cognitive radio networks will only be viable by implementing a
payout from the secondary users to the primary operator.
We agree with 2 that private commons may be a viable market option for cognitive
radio networks. On the one hand, such a model may be attractive to secondary users, who
may find guarantees provided by the licensed band attractive as an alternative to unlicensed
bands that may be overcrowded. On the other hand, it allows an exclusive use license holder
to “get adventurous” to aggressively use its spectrum, potentially for increased revenue
stream via per user periodic transactions—a form of a spot secondary market. Reference
3 actually proposes this scheme in order to realize Wi-Fi-like internet access operating on
Mathematical Problems in Engineering 3
whitespaces in the licensed spectrum and using cognitive radio technology, which is being
called Wi-Fi 2.0.
In the context of the above discussion, this paper analyzes a realization of the private
commons model where the secondary users implement cognitive radio technology and are
serviced by a mobile communications operator. The “secondary operator” coordinates the
access to spectrum “gaps” by the secondary users, and it conducts the associated spectrum
trading on a real-time or quasi-real-time basis with the license holder or “primary operator”.
Many papers can be found which analyze spectrum trading within the context of
cognitive radio networks. Reference 4 analyzes several secondary operators which request
spectrum to a license holder and which compete in terms of the requested spectrum size. The
license holder charges the operators according to a pricing function. A simple noncooperative
one-shot game model is proposed to find the equilibrium. More complex models can be
found in 5, 6, where two secondary operators lease spectrum from a license holder and
compete with each other in order to provide service to secondary users. Each secondary
operator should decide first upon the amount of spectrum leased and second upon the price
charged for the service, anticipating the users subscription decision. The users behavior may
be explicitly modeled through individual utility functions 6 or in an aggregated manner by
means of a demand function 5. In both papers, a multiple-stage dynamic game is proposed
to find the equilibrium.
The above models assume that secondary operators are the only ones which compete
to provide service to the users. In other words, that the market is created from scratch when
the secondary operators start to provide service. We argue that this assumption is unrealistic,
and that any realistic model should explicitly take into account the market legacy, that is, the
presence of an incumbent operator. Furthermore, within the framework of private commons,
this incumbent operator is the license holder which takes responsibility over the private
commons operation. This paper therefore analyzes a private commons scenario where the
primary operator is the incumbent operator and where a secondary operator intends to enter
the market. We believe that this scenario is the only feasible model for private commons in
cognitive radio networks.
Finally, this paper models in an explicit manner the utility received by the users
when subscribing to service. By explicit, we mean that no simplification is assumed for
the aggregated user demand, for example 5. Instead, an expression for the individual
user utility is proposed. In this expression, we introduce some basic technology-related
parameters which contribute to the transfer rate available for each user. This transfer rate is
the main indicator for the quality of service received by the users. A similar approach in the
modeling of the user utility as ours can be found in 7, whichmodels the interaction between
a mobile operator and a mobile virtual operator, and where the resource is measured in terms
of available time slots.
Our contribution is the introduction and analysis of amodel representing the economic
interactions between the primary operator PO, the secondary operator SO, and the users,
within the context of a private commons model and in general investigating the viability of
such a system. We design a two-level game where at the higher level the operators play on
the price, they will propose to users; at the lower level users distribute themselves between
operators depending on price and quality of service QoS. The oﬀered QoS also depends on
the number of customers, hence a fixed point equation to solve arises. We assume a number
of users large enough, so that the action of a single user will have a negligible impact on
the QoS received by the others. The game is solved by backward induction, meaning that at
a given level players act strategically by anticipating the solution of the game at the lower
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level. For fixed prices set by providers, we explicitly characterize the solution at the lower
game level as a Wardrop equilibrium, a concept coming from transportation theory 8. Nash
equilibrium is used to determine the solution of the pricing game between providers trying
to maximize revenue, when the amount of leased spectrum and the leasing cost are fixed.
Wardrop equilibrium, introduced as far back as 1952, forms the game theoretic foundation
of the investigation of population dynamics under evolution or learning behaviors. Since the
mid seventies, evolutionary game theory has provided an extension and a solid mathematical
background to the intuition of stability present from the inception. See 9 for a discussion on
the relationship of Wardrop equilibrium and the Evolutionary Stable Strategy concept, and
see 10, 11 for more recent advances in evolutionary game theory.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Next section describes the scenario under
analysis, and it develops the model, specifying each phase comprising the game, namely, the
subscription phase and the competition phase. Section 3 describes the procedure followed to
evaluate the diﬀerent equilibria that may arise in the game and shows the results obtained,
discussing the eﬀect of the diﬀerent parameters on the game equilibrium and assessing the
outcome from the point of view of the welfare. And finally, Section 4 draws some conclusions.
2. Model and Analysis
The model we will analyze is depicted in Figure 1. It is made of the following:
i one PO and one SO which compete in the service provision to the users;
ii n users that are assumed to have dual terminals, so that no technology-related
switching costs are incurred when making the subscription decision.
The PO leases an amount of b kHz to the SO, keeping for itself the rest, up to the
total amount of its licensed W kHz. The SO pays for that amount a price p m.u. per kHz.
m.u.  monetary units. Both the price p and the leased spectrum amount b are assumed to
be exogenously determined.
Users pay a subscription fee to the operator they have decided to subscripe to. A user
would pay pp m.u. if she subscribed to PO service, or ps m.u. if she subscribed to SO service.
All three prices p, pp, and ps are computed with respect to the same time period.
We assume that the operators compete a` la Bertrand 12; that is, they are playing a
one-shot simultaneous game where PO and SO strategies are pp and ps, respectively. The
equilibrium concept here is the Nash equilibrium.
Finally, each user will subscribe to the service providing the highest utility, which will
be shown to depend on the quality of service and on the price. The equilibrium notion is the
so-called Wardrop equilibrium 8, 13. Wardrop equilibrium was proposed by Wardrop, an
English transport analyst, in 1952, as a rule to solve the traﬃc assignment problem, which
concerns the selection of routes between origins and destinations in transportation networks.
We are specifically interested in Wardrop’s first principle, which says that:
“the journey times on all routes actually used are equal, and less than those which would
be experienced by a single vehicle on any unused route.”
This principle postulates that each vehicle seeks in a noncooperative manner to
minimize its journey time, which is similar to the Nash equilibrium. Additionally, the
Wardrop’s first principle assumes that the population of vehicles is infinite, so that
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Figure 1: Payment flows and use of resources by the diﬀerent agents.
the contribution to journey times by any individual vehicle is zero. This allows to postulate
an identical journey times equilibrium.
Applied to our model, in the Wardrop equilibrium the users are indiﬀerent between
choosing one operator or the other one, and therefore no user has an incentive to switch, and
assuming that the number of users n is high enough, the individual subscription decision
of each user will not aﬀect the utility perceived by the rest. That will imply that the utility
received at theWardrop equilibrium by every user will be the same regardless of the operator
she subscribes to.
Taking into account both the operators and users behaviors, the strategic interaction
between the two operators and the n users is modeled using noncooperative game theory.
Specifically, we use a two-level multileader-follower game, which comprises two games:
1 Price Competition Game:
The PO oﬀers a subscription price pp, and the SO oﬀers ps.
2 Subscription Game:
Each user chooses which operator to subscribe to.
A standard way to analyze this sort of games is by means of backward induction: the
price competition game is played knowing—anticipating—what would be the outcome of the
subscription game, which is played later. We now show how the outcomes of those games can
be computed.
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2.1. Subscription Game: Second Phase
In this phase, a pair of values b and p has been fixed, and the prices pp and ps have been
announced.
The utility that the users receive from each operator depends on two factors.
Quality of Service
Each operator exploits, during each subscription period, an amount of spectrum b for the SO
and W − b for the PO. Furthermore, each operator is assumed to use a diﬀerent technology,
which results in diﬀerent levels of spectral eﬃciency: kp and ks are the spectral eﬃciencies
for the PO and the SO, respectively. Both the modulation schemes and the medium access
control mechanisms are modeled by kp and ks. We assume that kp < ks. Bearing in
mind the above two issues, the product of the spectrum by the spectral eﬃciency for each
operator, divided by the number of users which subscribe to it, will give the transfer rate
that is oﬀered to each user 14. We propose to use this transfer rate as the quality factor Qp
andQs contributing to the user utility, through an increasing concave logarithmic function
15. Specifically,
Qp  log
(
kp
W − b
np
)
,
Qs  log
(
ks
b
ns
)
,
2.1
where np resp., ns is the number of users subscribing to the PO, respectively, the SO.
Price
The higher the subscription price, the lower the user utility. We consider quasi-linear user
utility functions: the utility is the diﬀerence between the value of the service and the price
paid.
Based on the above discussion, the expressions for that user utility if subscribing to the
PO or the SO are, respectively,
Up  Qp − pp  log
(
kp
W − b
np
)
− pp,
Us  Qs − ps  log
(
ks
b
ns
)
− ps.
2.2
A selfish user will subscribe to the service provided by the PO rather than the SO if
Up > Us, that is,
log
(
kp
W − b
np
)
− pp > log
(
ks
b
ns
)
− ps, 2.3
and reciprocally.
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As stated above, at a user Wardrop equilibrium, the users should spread between the
operators PO and SO in such a way that no user has an incentive to switch to the competing
operator. For this to happen,Up  Us must hold for every subscriber or equivalently:
log
(
kp
W − b
n∗p
)
− pp  log
(
ks
b
n∗s
)
− ps, 2.4
where the asterisk stands for equilibrium values.
Given that we assume that all users subscribe service, and the following restriction
holds
np 	 ns  n. 2.5
Let α denote the fraction of subscribers that subscribe to PO, and 1 − α to SO. Then np and ns
can be expressed as functions of α as follows:
np  αn, ns  1 − αn. 2.6
2.2. Price Competition Game: First Phase
In this phase, a pair of values b and p has been fixed, and each operator chooses its pricing
strategy so as to maximize its profits. Each operator does not know the strategy chosen by its
competitor, but common knowledge of the strategies available to them and the corresponding
profits is assumed. The outcome of the subscription game is assumed to be anticipated by
both operators and taken into account in the pricing decisions.
The profits of the PO and the SO can be expressed, respectively, as
Πp  np · pp 	 p · b − Cp,
Πs  ns · ps − p · b − Cs,
2.7
where Cp and Cs are the operating costs born by the PO and the SO, respectively.
When solving the equilibrium equations for the first and the second phase, n∗p and n
∗
s
may be expressed as functions of pp and ps, so that operator profits are functions of pp and ps
only:
Πp  Πp
(
pp, ps
)
, Πp  Πs
(
pp, ps
)
. 2.8
Now, turning our attention to the pricing game, the equilibrium strategies p∗p and p
∗
s are given
by the Nash equilibrium conditions 12:
Πp
(
p∗p, p
∗
s
)
≥ Πp
(
pp, p
∗
s
)
, ∀pp,
Πs
(
p∗p, p
∗
s
)
≥ Πs
(
p∗p, ps
)
, ∀ps,
2.9
meaning that no operator can unilaterally increase its profits by a price change.
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Under the assumption that the partial derivatives of Πp and of Πs with respect to pp
and ps exist, the Nash equilibrium can be determined by looking at the solutions of the first-
order conditions:
0 
∂Πp
(
p∗p, p
∗
s
)
∂pp
 n
(
α∗ 	 p∗p
∂α∗
∂pp
)
,
0 
∂Πs
(
p∗p, p
∗
s
)
∂ps
 n
(
1 − α∗ − p∗s
∂α∗
∂ps
)
.
2.10
To obtain the expression of the partial derivatives of α∗ with respect to pp and ps, we
proceed as follows. From 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 we obtain
pp − ps  log
(
kpW − b
ksb
)
− logα∗ 	 log1 − α∗, 2.11
which can be diﬀerentiated with respect to pp and ps and gives
∂α∗
∂pp
 −∂α
∗
∂ps
 −α∗1 − α∗. 2.12
If thsse above expression is inserted in 2.10, p∗p and p
∗
s can be expressed as functions
of α∗.
p∗p 
1
1 − α∗ ,
p∗s 
1
1 − 1 − α∗ .
2.13
Finally, substituting 2.13 in 2.4, the following equation is obtained for α∗, the
fraction of subscribers selecting PO at the equilibrium as follows:
1
1 − α∗  log1 − α
∗ 	
1
1 − 1 − α∗ 	 log
(
kpW − b
ksb
)
. 2.14
Note that the function fx  logx 	 1/1 − x is continuous, increasing for x > 0 and
that limx→ 0  −∞. We can then infer that there exists a unique value of α∗ ∈ 0, 1 which
satisfies 2.14.
3. Results and Discussion
From the equations of the preceding section, given parameters n, W , b, kp, ks, and p,
we model the competition between PO and SO for the service provision to users with dual
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terminals as amultileader-follower game, which results inWardrop equilibriummarket share
α∗ from solving 2.14, and Nash equilibrium prices p∗p and p
∗
s obtained from 2.13. Asterisks
are hereafter removed for the sake of simplicity.
The values for the parameters, if not stated otherwise, are the following ones: n 
10000 user,W  100 kHz,Cp  20m.u.,Cs  10m.u., kp  1 bit/s/Hz, and ks  2 bit/s/Hz.
A value of p  120m.u./kHz has been chosen.
In order to assess the equilibrium, we have solved the equations and computed the
following indicators:
i PO market share α;
ii prices pp and ps;
iii user utilitiesUp  Us;
iv operator profitsΠp and Πs;
v the Price of Anarchy PoA.
The PoA is related to the concept of social welfare 16 or total surplus 17, which is
computed as the sum of the utilities of all agents in the systems i.e., users and operators.
Using the notation of our model, social welfare SW can be expressed as
SW  np ·Up 	 ns ·Us 	 Πp 	 Πs. 3.1
It is well known in game theory that agent selfishness, such as in a Nash equilibrium,
does not lead in general to a socially eﬃcient situation, that is, yielding maximum social
welfare. As a measure of the loss of eﬃciency due to the divergence of user interests, we use
the Price of Anarchy 18, which we defined as the quotient between the maximum value of
the social welfare and the social welfare obtained at the Nash equilibrium. This quotient is
becoming increasingly popular for measuring how ineﬃcient a system is when independent
agents are operating in a decentralized manner; see, for instance, its application to resource
allocation in 19, 20.
In the following paragraphs, we present the results of two experiments.
3.1. On the Value of the Leased Spectrum
In Figures 2 and 3, we show the eﬀect of varying the amount b of leased spectrum.
We point out that, first, as b increases, the user utility reaches a maximum at b/W ≈
0.45, while the maximum social welfare PoA  1 is reached at b/W ≈ 0.35. Second, as
b increases from b  0, the PO loses users, and it is forced to lower pp; Πp decreases, and
although it increases for higher values of b, it does not reach the initial value, and third, the
SO stoles users from the PO, and it is able to raise ps. Thus, Πs increases as b increases.
The above observations mean that:
i the PO does not have any incentive to lease spectrum. This fact suggests that the
incumbent operator should be forced to lease a minimum amount of spectrum in
order to reach the user or social optima;
ii once in the vicinity of these optimal points, both the PO and the SO prefer b/W to
be as large as possible, that is, equal to 1. This behavior suggests that a maximum
amount of leased spectrum should be set.
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Figure 2: Eﬀect of variation of b/W on α, prices, utilities, and PoA.
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Figure 3: Eﬀect of variation of b/W on profits.
We can conclude, therefore, that a regulatory intervention case is justified, where
both a minimum and a maximum values for leased spectrum should be set by a regulatory
authority.
3.2. Spectral Efficiency
In Figures 4 and 5, we show the eﬀect of varying the spectral eﬃciency ks. The value for b
is fixed at b/W  0.2.
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Figure 5: Eﬀect of variation of ks on profits.
We point out that, as ks increases with respect to kp  1, the user utility improves,
and the social welfare keeps high; the PoA is slightly greater than 1 and approaching the
unity. From the point of view of the operators, the PO loses users, and it is forced to lower pp
and reduces its profits Πp, while the SO increases its market share, and it is able to raise ps
and increases its profits Πs.
We can conclude that the improvement in the QoS that the SO achieves through
technology innovation ks > kp causes an improvement not only on the SO profits but
also on the utility received by all users.
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4. Conclusions
We have proposed a realistic scenario for mobile communications service deployment based
on the introduction of cognitive radio technology. The cognitive radio technology is adopted
by an entrant operator, which is then technologically more eﬃcient than the incumbent
operator. The incumbent operator owns a spectrum license, and it leases spectrum to the
entrant operator.
We have modeled the economical interaction between the incumbent and the entrant,
and we have analyzed the eﬀects of the entry from the point of view of the mobile
communications users, from that of the incumbent, from that of the entrant, and from that
of the general interest.
The conclusions reached have been the following ones.
1 There is indeed a business case for the entrant, which gets higher profits the larger
the fraction of spectrum leased is.
2 The technological innovation adopted by the entrant, which is modeled by the
spectral eﬃciency, is beneficial for the entrant.
3 All users improve their situation by the facts that some spectrum is leased to
the entrant up to a fraction of the total available amount and that the entrant
innovates.
4 Regulatory intervention is justified by users utility and social welfare arguments.
In a future work, we plan to extend our analysis in three ways. First, to allow
both operators to bargain over the price and quantity of leased spectrum, so that neither
b nor p are set exogenously. Second, to model the user willingness to pay, so that some
users may decide to subscribe to neither PO nor SO. Thirdly, to gain better insight into
the interaction between the users, progressing away from the simplifying assumptions of
Wardrop equilibrium. A promising line of analysis is evolutionary game theory, which would
incorporate evolutionary dynamics so as to model the behavior of the users in a more realistic
way. More advanced approaches, such as coevolutionary game theory, which would assist in
modeling how the interaction between users change in time, may be fruitful 21.
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